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Abstract: 
 
The paper discusses public experiences of policing in today’s Russia, public attitudes 
towards police resulting from such experiences and wider social implications of those 
attitudes.   At the basis of the discussion is an empirical study which has been carried out 
by the author.  The study has found abundant evidence of distrust towards – and fear of – 
police by contemporary Russians.  It is argued that the corrupt, brutal and unaccountable 
police who lack legitimacy in the eyes of citizens trigger public responses that may help to 
deepen social inequalities, subvert the process of establishing the rule of law and impede 
the Russian transition to democracy.  Moreover, if citizens view the police as illegitimate – 
indeed, believe that the very state agency designed to protect them actually presents threats 
to their security – the legitimacy of the entire state structure is at risk.   
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Introduction  
To various degrees police legitimacy is a problem in every society, however it is 
particularly acute in societies undergoing change and experiencing rising social tensions 
(Weitzer 1995, Mishler and Rose 1998, Goldsmith 2005).  This paper focuses on the case 
of Russia as an empirical study and uses narratives derived from in-depth interviews with 
members of the public who have had encounters with the police in the post-Soviet period 
to demonstrate the lack of police legitimacy.  The paper discusses the failure to create a 
trusted police force on the ruins of the communist empire and the resulting persistence and 
growth of the informal sector and informal social relations.  It argues that the dysfunctional 
state of contemporary Russian policing triggers public responses that may help to deepen 
social inequalities, subvert the process of establishing the rule of law and impede the 
transition to democracy.  
The study upon which this paper is based contributes to the literature which examines 
public attitudes towards the contemporary Russian police.  There is abundant evidence 
from surveys conducted in post-Soviet Russia that public trust towards the police is very 
low (Mel’nik 2001, Gryaznova 2005; Gudkov and Dubin 2006; Nevirko et al 2006; 
Obschestvennyi Verdikt 2009, Levada Centre 2011, 2012a, 2012b).  Most surveys indicate 
that only around 10-20% of citizens trust the institution
2
.  Opinion polls also show that 
many members of the public are reluctant to report criminal incidents to the police
 
(Mazaev 1997; Gudkov 2000; Gilinskiy 2005)
3
.  Typically that research stops at asking 
respondents about their attitudes towards the police and sometimes enquires about their 
inclinations to report crimes.   
This study goes a step further and analyses broader social implications of negative 
attitudes towards the police.  Most scholars studying post-socialist transition tend to focus 
on reforms of the economy
4
 and the political institutions and processes (such as the parties, 
presidency, elections)
5
.  Those analysing the process of establishment of the rule of law 
tend to concentrate attention on the reform and functioning of the judicial process and 
legal institutions, especially in the context of resolution of economic conflicts (Hendley 
2009a, 2009b, Kurchiyan 2003, Ledeneva 2006, Rogov 2010).  Police reform as an 
element integral in the process of Russian democratic transition has been understudied.  
This paper adds to the growing body of literature that analyses Russian transition to 
                                                             
2  For example, Shlapentokh (2006) cites evidence that only 10% of Russians fully trust the police.  
Gudkov and Dubin (2006) report that in a sample of 1600 respondents only 12% fully trust the police 
and 40% fully distrust the institution, with the rest expressing incomplete trust.  Gerber and Mendelson 
(2008) found that in a survey of 11,202 respondents, only 3% believe that police ‘fully’ deserve trust, 
23% say they ‘probably’ deserve trust, 36% say ‘probably not’, and 29% say ‘not at all’.  By 
comparison, in Western Europe around 80% of respondents trust the police, according to the World 
Values Survey.  In the United States national opinion polls show that the majority of Americans hold a 
favourable image of the police and report either a ‘great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence in the police, 
as Gallup polls demonstrate.    
3  So, in one study only between 2 and 8% of victims said they reported crimes to police (with the 
exception of serious crimes, in which case the majority report a crime) (Gudkov 2000).  In another study 
two-thirds of crime victims did not report crimes to police (Gilinskiy 2005). 
4  For example, Aslund 2002, Gaddy 2002, Gaddy and Ickes 2002, Hellman 2002,  Aslund 2010, Hanson 
2012, Robinson 2013. 
5  For example, White 2000, Holmes 2002, Shevtsova 2002, 2008, 2012, Fish 2005, Wilson 2005, Aslund 
2007, Remington 2011. 
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democracy by discussing dangers that flow from the failure to build a democratic and 
legitimate police force and the resulting public distrust towards the institution.   
While this study investigated police practices in Russia, its conclusions may apply outside 
the Russian context.  It may help to shed light on problems that arise in connection with 
policing in other societies dealing with legacies of authoritarianism.  Also, by drawing 
attention to some of the negative consequences resulting from the loss of police credibility 
among citizens, the study may act as a warning to citizens in the Western countries about 
the dangers of democratic erosion in their own societies.   
Theoretical context 
Russia’s transition to democracy 
Russia has been frequently described as being ‘in transition’ following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.  That transition involved a move away from centrally planned economy 
towards a free market, and simultaneously a shift from totalitarianism to democracy.  In 
the early 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, expectations were high that, 
after decades of totalitarianism, Russia would take a pro-Western course and embark on 
democratising its political system, embracing the rule of law and granting its citizens civil 
rights.  However, twenty years later it is evident that those aspirations have not been 
realised.  Today experts disagree on the direction the Russian transition has taken.  Some 
believe that Russia is an ‘immature’ democracy gradually evolving into the full-fledged 
variety.  Others have concluded that Russian transition to democracy had run aground 
(McFaul et al 2004, Krastev 2006, Furman 2008, Shevtsova 2008, Sakwa 2011).   
On this later view, Russia presents a hybrid regime combining both democratic and 
authoritarian features.  It is formally committed to constitutional democracy and liberal 
capitalism, yet in practice many of the regime’s actions are authoritarian in spirit.  For 
example, there are elections which are held regularly and which appear to be conducted in 
accordance with the appropriate normative framework.  However, in practice they are 
unfree and unfair, so the opposition has no prospect of challenging the ruling party.  
Elections are manipulated and used to legitimise the regime, rather than allowing fair 
political competition and open outcomes (Shevtsova 2002, 2012, Fish 2005, Wilson 2005, 
Wood 2012).  The coercive agencies of the state are regularly used to supress actual and 
potential opponents to the state leadership and to weaken or neutralize threats to the ruling 
party (Taylor 2011).  Although the constitution proclaims the rule of law and its formal 
provisions are largely compatible with the requirements of a liberal democratic order, the 
rule of law is regularly abused through administrative practices, and the judicial process is 
undermined by political interference (Greenberg 2009, Hendley 2009a, 2009b).  The state 
has a federal structure, yet the central government dictates policy to the regions.  
Technically there is a free market, but state officials constantly interfere with the economy.  
The constitution gives the President excessive powers which are only weakly constrained; 
individual and group liberties are poorly protected; legal institutions are corrupt and 
inefficient; the media is dependent on owners with political motivations; the civil society is 
weak, passive and apolitical, and governmental policies, aimed at suppression of 
opposition, cripple it even further (Weigle 2002, Howard 2003, Taylor 2011, Herszenhorn 
2012, Mendras 2012, Wood 2012).   
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Several commentators have described contemporary Russia as a ‘Potemkin democracy’, or 
‘imitation democracy’ (Wilson 2005, Shevtsova 2008).  By proclaiming democratic 
credentials and retaining the formal democratic institutions, traditional power 
arrangements are masked, and an illusion of democracy is created.  As a result, the country 
is unable to move towards genuine democracy because of the reality of autocratic 
tendencies and practices, and at the same time the return towards authoritarianism is 
inhibited due to the formal commitment to democratic ideals.  Russia remains ‘lost in 
transition’ (Shevtsova 2008), and is likely to stay in crisis indefinitely, unless steps are 
taken towards strengthening democratic institutions and practices (Sakwa 2011).   
Ideas of the commentations who claim that Russia is in transition to nowhere and presents 
a case of an ‘imitation democracy’ will be revisited later in this paper. Of course, obstacles 
to the Russian transition are multiple, and complex historical, economic and political 
factors account for the lack of progress (McFaul et al 2004).  Yet,  using findings of my 
empirical study, this paper will argue that contemporary Russian police that lacks 
legitimacy and trust of polulation may do more to hamper Russian transition to democracy 
than any other institution.  It will be further suggested that recent police reform carried out 
by President Medvedev may result in creating a police force that merely imitates its 
Western democratic counterparts and complements the Russian political system of 
‘Potemkin democracy’. 
‘Predatory’ policing  
The style, nature and quality of policing are important indicators of the character of 
government (Marenin 1985, Bayley 2001, 2006).  The comparative literature on policing 
identifies a tension faced by the police.  It is the tension between, on the one hand, 
primarily serving the society, upholding the law and protecting citizens from crime and, on 
the other hand, primarily serving the state and maintaining the political order (Marenin 
1996, Mawby 1999, Das and Marenin 2000).  Ronald Weitzer (1995) distinguishes 
between two main theoretical models of the role of the police.  He labels the first model a 
‘functionalist’ model and the second – a ‘divided society’ model.  When the ‘functionalist’ 
model is adopted, police serve the society as whole, enforcing the law, providing services 
to the public and protecting the order and stability of the social system (Weitzer 1995:3).  
In the ‘divided society’ model police uphold the interests of the dominant groups and 
suppress subordinate groups or the political opposition (Weitzer 1995:5).  The 
‘functionalist’ model is typical in most developed democracies, while the ‘divided society’ 
model can be found in authoritarian societies and societies which are sharply polarized 
along racial, ethnic or religious lines.  Of course, these models are ideal types, and in 
reality no police system will correspond exactly to one model in its pure form.  Yet, 
determining the dominant model or a mix of models may help to understand the police 
orientation and role in a given society.   
Gerber and Mendelson (2008) have suggested that the model of policing in contemporary 
Russia does not fall neatly into either the ‘functionalist’ or the ‘divided society’ model.  
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Rather, it presents a third model: a model of ‘predatory’ policing6.  Predatory policing is 
primarily oriented towards personal gain and advancing their own interests by police.  
Police use their position to extract money, goods and services from members of the public.  
Violence is employed towards two main ends.  Firstly, it is used as a means of extracting 
rents from the population.  Secondly, it is used to assist the government in suppression of 
opposition groups or to create an impression of solving criminal cases in order to secure 
the access to opportunities for extracting rents (Gerber and Mendelson 2008:5).   
Gerber and Mendelson (2008) argue that the model of predatory policing goes hand-in-
hand with the ‘divided society’ model identified by Weitzer (1995).  So, in their survey of 
2,408 Russian respondents, 37 per cent thought that most of all Russian police ‘serve their 
own material interests’, 28 per cent believed that the Russian police mostly ‘serve the 
interests of elites’ and 25 per cent thought that the police mostly ‘preserve public order and 
protect citizens’ (Gerber and Mendelson 2008: 28-29).  That is, upholding interests of the 
dominant groups was viewed as the key function of police by more than a quarter of 
respondents.  Brian Taylor (2011) makes an observation that supports these findings.  He 
argues that while Russian policing gravitates towards the predatory style that advances the 
material interests of individual officers, Russian law enforcement institutions (including 
the police) in recent years have also been successful in subduing political opponents.  
Since President Putin came to power in 2000, the ‘regime of repression’ was rebuilt in 
Russia that is used to weaken opposition parties and movements, so that the opposition has 
no prospect of challenging the ruling party.  To quote Taylor, ‘Russian law enforcement 
organs tend to treat their mission as one of repression or predation, not protection’ 
(2011:33).   The dominant predatory and repressive police practices undermine the 
creation of a civil state rooted in the rule of law (Taylor 2011:305).  
This paper supports this view.  It offers empirical evidence demonstrating that public 
perception of police officers primarily as predators and, when required by their powerful 
patrons, servants of the political regime, results in widespread distrust, and even fear, 
towards the police.  That perception produces behavioural orientations on the part of 
Russian members of the public which heighten the sense of social inequalities, undermine 
the development of the rule of law and threaten to destabilise the entire process of 
democratization. 
Public distrust and informal mechanisms 
Public institutions, including the police, reflect the nature of the state in which they exist.    
Gerbert and Mendelson’s idea of predatory policing fits well with the concept of 
‘predatory’ states articulated by Peter Evans (1989).  In predatory states those who control 
the state apparatus extract resources from the population and provide very little in the way 
of ‘collective goods’.  They ‘plunder without any more regard for the welfare of the 
citizenry than a predator has for the welfare of its prey’ (Evans 1989:562).  Most Russians 
would agree that Evan’s concept of predatory states describes accurately post-Soviet 
Russia: for the majority of them the state institutions are unreliable in providing their 
                                                             
6
  Russia is not a unique example of predatory policing.  Other examples include such countries as Mexico, 
Argentina, Brasil, Nigeria and European Post-Communist countries (Igbinovia 1985, Beck and 
Chystyakova 2002, 2004, Botello and Riviera 2000, Uildricks and Van Reenen 2003, Hinton 2005, 
2009, Asiwaju and Marenin 2009, Davis 2009).  
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services, and state officials are corrupt and serve their own interests, rather than those of 
the citizenry as a whole (Rose 1999, Mendras 2011:chapter 6; Kostikov 2012).  
Russia’s rankings in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index are 
consistently very poor
7
.  The public perception of corruption is especially high with 
respect to law enforcement instiutions and the police in particular, as has been consistently 
demonstrated through public surveys (Mazaev 1997, Varygin 2002, Levada 2005, Gudkov 
et al 2004, Gryaznova 2005).  That is, Russian citizens believe that the very bodies tasked 
with upholding the law are its most persistent violators.  Of course, the real extent of 
corruption is impossible to know
8
.  Yet, whatever the real scale of corruption is, its 
perception by citizens is important as it damages public trust towards law enforcement and 
governmental institutions in general.   
It needs to be pointed out that while it is generally believed that post-socialism is 
characterised by significant rise in corruption, during communism corruption in Russia 
(and Eastern Europe as a whole) was pervasive too, with bribery and use of personal 
connections, known as blat, being part of daily existence.  Blat enabled everyday survival 
in the conditions of permanent economic shortages (Ledeneva 1998).  Although blat was a 
classic example of misuse of public office for private gain, it was considered socially 
acceptable
9
.  Blat disappeared with the end of the economy of shortages in the post-Soviet 
era.  It was replaced by bribe, as social relationships were monetised.  This transition has 
widened the gap between those who do and do not have money to pay bribes, and those 
who do and do not have power to extort them.  That in turn has contributed to the growing 
sense of social inequalities in the post-socialist societies and augmented accusations that 
governmental institutions are totally corrupt (Krastev 2004). 
Opinion polls conducted in the post-Soviet Russia consistently reveal high levels of 
popular distrust of almost all public institutions (Rose-Ackerman 2001).  With the 
exception of the President, during the post-Soviet era no one public institution has 
gathered more than 40 or 50 per cent of nation’s trust and most attain confidence level of 
only 10 to 30 per cent
10
 (Shlapentokh 2006, Mendras 2012).   Analysing the relationship 
between the Russian state and its citizens, Richard Rose (1995) has described Russia as an 
‘hour-glass’ society.  At the base of such society there is a rich social life, which consists 
                                                             
7
  However, there have been some recent improvements with Russia moving upwards from the 154th place 
(out of 178 countries) in 2010 to 143
rd
 place (out of 182 countries) in 2011 to 133
rd
 place (out of 176 
countries) in 2012.  
8  Internal Security Service charged with the internal control of the Russian police has reported that in 2012 
they uncovered 1518 incidents of corruption, out of which 303 were cases of bribery (Falaleev 2012), 
however this figure is likely to reflect only the tip of the iceberg. 
 
9  One reason for its social acceptability may be that blat took a non-monetary form and involved an 
exchange of favours.  Another reason may be that blat transactions were mis-recognised as ‘help’ and 
disguised in the rhetoric of friendship (Krastev 2004).   
10
  For example, findings of the survey conducted by Levada Center (2011) show that in 2009 only 7 per 
cent trusted the political parties, 20 per cent trusted the Parliament, 30 per cent trusted the government, 
22 per cent trusted the courts and 19 per cent trusted the police.  President, the church and the army were 
most trusted institutions, gaining 66 per cent, 50 per cent and 38 per cent of trust respectively.    In 
October 2012, 51 per cent trusted the President, 50 per cent - the church, 39 per cent - the army, 13 per 
cent - political parties, 20 per cent - the Parliament, 29 per cent - the government, 23 per cent - the courts 
and 20 per cent – the police (Levada Centre 2012a).   
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of strong informal networks that rely on trust between individuals.  At the top there is also 
a rich political and social life, with elites competing for wealth, power and prestige.  Yet 
the links between the top and the bottom are very limited.  Citizens in an ‘hour-glass’ 
society do not expect to influence the state activities through democratic channels.  They 
distrust the state and try to minimise their contact with it (Rose 1995:35, Rose, Mishler, 
Haerpfer 1997:3). They do not look to the state for protection, and much of everyday life is 
organised to insulate people from the negative effects of the state which is not regarded as 
‘citizen friendly’.  
While trust in public institutions in post-Soviet Russia is chronically low, levels of inter-
personal trust are not, so, when in trouble, people turn for help to their immediate social 
networks  (Rose 1995:36-8, Rose-Ackerman 2001:426-7).  Confronted with the situation 
where public institutions are widely distrusted and considered unreliable, post-Soviet 
citizens have been challenged to develop ways of compensating for the failure by the state 
to perform many of its functions.  They had to learn self-sufficiency and independence 
from the state institutions, and in the process a variety of coping techniques and informal 
methods based on inter-personal relations evolved, many of which have been described by 
researchers of everyday strategies of adaptation utilized by citizens of post-socialist 
countries (Rose 1999, 2001, Burawoy et al 2000, Humphrey 2002, Polese 2006, 2009, 
Shevchenko 2009, Stenning, et al 2010).  While some of these strategies involved building 
upon pre-existing informal networks, such as blat mentioned above, others were new.  
Reliance on such informal solutions enables people to survive in the midst of the post-
soviet turmoil (Rose 1999).   
Important in this context are public attitudes towards legal institutions in post-Soviet 
Russia.  They are regarded as corrupt and arbitrary, and the idea that law could be utilised 
by ordinary people to protect themselves from abuse of power by the state officials is 
generally considered unrealistic (Hendley 1999, Kurkchiyan 2003).  Scepticism of 
ordinary Russians towards the law’s ability to protect them is deep-rooted: it long pre-
dates the socialist revolution, and then both communist rulers and their post-Soviet 
successors have reinforced that scepticism by open lawless behaviour and manipulation of 
law when it suited them (Newcity 1997, Hendley 2009a).  So, rather than turning to law, 
Russians prefer to employ entrenched informal mechanisms and solve problems by using 
personal connections, cutting corners and making side payments (Hendley 2009a, 2009b, 
Ledeneva 2006, Rogov 2010).   
Using my empirical findings, this paper will argue that the popular distrust of the police 
and law in general makes the prospects of Russian transition to a democratic society based 
on the rule of law bleak.  The police force lacking legitimacy in the eyes of citizens 
contributes to persistence and growth of informal methods and social relations that 
compensate for dysfunctional policing.  Some of the prevailing informal methods may 
present threats to human rights and challenge the rule of law.  Also, the unwillingness to 
turn to law in an attempt to hold to account police abusing their power may help to 
perpetuate the unwanted social conditions. 
 
 
 
  Internet Journal of Criminology 
©
 2013 
  ISSN 2045-6743 (Online) 
 
www.internetjournalofcriminology.com  8 
 
 
Russian police: background   
From militsiya to politsiya 
During the 74 years of the Soviet rule the Russian police (until recently known as the 
militsiya, but on the 1
st
 of March 2011 renamed into the politsiya) operated to weaken or 
neutralize threats to the existing order (Shelley 1996, 1999; Pustintsev 2000; Uildriks and 
Reenen 2003).  It functioned as a tool of the Communist party which managed the 
organisation both from within and above.  It had a highly centralised militaristic structure, 
and there was a well-established system of subordination and control.  Militsiya had very 
wide powers to intrude in many aspects of people’s lives, and played an important role of 
maintaining social control by sustaining close watch on everyday activities of Soviet 
citizens (Shelley 1996:chapter 7).  The militsiya was subordinate to the Communist party, 
and its was not accountable to citizens.  It functioned in an authoritarian environment 
where legal protection against abuses of power by its officers was virtually non-existent.  
The consequence was a general public distrust towards militsia and a tendency on the part 
of citizens to avoid encounters with it whenever possible.      
As Russia began its transit away from socialism, the militsiya found itself in a weakened 
and unstable state (Gilinskiy 2000; Safronov 2003; Gudkov et al 2004; Beck and 
Robertson 2009a, 2009b; Galeotti 2010a; Favarel-Garrigues 2011: chapter 9).  A large-
scale staff turnover took place within the institution since the late 1980s
11
.  Many officers 
were fired from their jobs as part of campaigns against corruption and criminality within 
the institution.  Others left voluntarily.  Among the main reasons for leaving was the low 
pay, poor working conditions and the fact that the profession of a militsiya officer was one 
of the least prestigious.  Because of the high personnel turn-over, combined with 
insufficient training, militsiya officers could not develop a high level of professionalism 
and acquire a clear concept of relevant legal and ethical standards.  This led to widespread 
violations of legal and ethical standards by militsia (Gilinskiy 2004, Pustintsev 2000, 
Safronov 2003). 
The situation was aggravated by a lack of controls over the militsiya.  The strict control 
exercised by the Communist party was gone, and new forms of accountability were 
ineffective (Uildriks and Van Reenen 2003, Beck and Robertson 2005).   The internal 
control over the militsiya was conducted by the Minister of Internal Affairs and the 
Internal Security Service.  The external control was carried out by the President and the 
Prokuratura. The Prokuratura was charged with both, investigating and prosecuting a 
defendant, and protection of the rights of suspects and defendants.  This created a conflict 
of interests, with the consequence that numerous – and often very serious – violations of 
rights of suspects and defendants were tolerated.  The informal oversight was 
accomplished through the media and human rights groups.  However, it was (and still is) 
weak because of the restrictions placed on the media and NGOs as part of the 
governmental repression of its critics: such informal oversight is viewed by government 
more as a threat to state power than a valuable asset (Beck and Robertson 2009a:62, 
Taylor 2011:4).  The overreliance on internal monitoring and weak outside controls over 
the militsiya has resulted in conditions conducive to abuses of power by its officers on a 
massive scale. 
                                                             
11  It is estimated that in 1991-96 up to 200,000 were leaving the militsiya each year (Volkov 2002a:132). 
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At the time when the first and the second waves of my empirical research were carried out, 
the legislative framework within which the militsiya operated was provided in the Law 
‘On the Militsiya’, passed in 1991 (on the 1st of March 2011 it was replaced by the Law 
‘On the Politsiya’).  The Law ‘On the Militsiya’ defined the status, organisation and 
powers of the militsiya.  The institution was divided into the Criminal militsiya and the 
Civil Safety militsiya.  The entire force was under direction of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs.  Although on paper the system appeared decentralised, in practice it was highly 
centralised and organised on the basis of hierarchy.  This created a situation where 
centrally determined targets were prioritised and local needs were met poorly (Galeotti 
2003).  The Law ‘On the Militsiya’ gave the institution a wide range of powers.  For 
example, the militsiya issued passports, residence permits, visas, automobile registrations, 
various certificates ranging from drivers’ licences to work permits.  Such extensive 
regulatory powers provided many opportunities for abuse and corruption by militsiya.    
The Law ‘On the Militsiya’ articulated the principles and values guiding actions of its 
officers.  Article 3 of the Law declared that activities of militsiya must be conducted in 
accordance with the principles of respect for human rights and freedoms, lawfulness, 
humanism and transparency.  Article 5 prohibited militsiya using torture, violence and 
other cruel or degrading treatment.  Unfortunately, the principles of respect for human 
rights and freedoms, lawfulness and humanism declared to guide the conduct of militsiya 
have not been followed to the letter.  There is abundant evidence of militsiya violations of 
human rights, corruption and involvement in crime, including organised crime (Glikin 
1998; Human Rights Watch 1999; Amnesty International 2002, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 
2008; Pustintsev 2000; Khinstein 2005).  Militisya corruption, extortion, brutality and 
criminality have been a daily recurring theme in the media in post-Soviet Russia, and 
many citizens experienced them first-hand.  Obtaining reliable statistics on the extent of 
unlawful behaviour by militsiya is virtually impossible since this information is not 
disclosed to the public and wrongdoings are regularly covered up.  Yet, available research 
into public experiences of policing demonstrates that abuses of power by militisya happen 
on a massive scale (Gudkov et al 2004; Gerber and Mendelson 2008).  Some evidence 
derived from self-reports leads to similar conclusions
12
.  
In the post-Soviet period multiple attempts have been made at reforming the militsiya and 
resolving the crisis within the institution, however they were patchy and superficial.  They 
were limited to numerous confusing reorganisations and failed to revitalise the force and 
bring it closer to its counterparts found in democratic societies.  The militaristic structure 
and appearance of the militsiya were retained, and many Soviet trends and traditions 
continued.  For instance, the performance of the militsiya continued to be measured by the 
ability to meet quotas of solved crimes.  As such quotas were typically unrealistic, it 
encouraged the use of torture to obtain ‘confessions’ (Human Rights Watch 1999).  
Although the institution of militsiya is declared politically-neutral, it has been repeatedly 
used for political ends and repression against state opponents (Shelley 1999, Galeotti 2003, 
Taylor 2007, 2011).  There have been multiple incidents of militsiya harassment of civil 
society activists and opposition parties, groups and leaders, as well as violent suppression 
of anti-governmental rallies and protests (BBC 2012, Carbonnel and Tsvetkova 2012, 
CBC news 2012, Eshechenko et al 2012, KM.RU 2012, Malover’yan 2012, Potalev 2012).  
                                                             
12
  40% of militsiyamen-respondents in one study admitted that they engaged in criminal activities.  
Moreover, it was found that criminal activities take place mostly during official working hours of 
militsiya, precisely when they are supposed to fight crime (Kolennikova 2006). 
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Thus, the the Soviet trend of using the militsiya to prop up the political regime has been 
preserved.  
Most recent reforms of the militsiya were launched in December 2009 by President 
Medvedev.  On the 1
st
 of March 2011 the new Law ‘On the Politsiya’ came into force.  It 
renamed the militsiya into the politsiya, returning its original, tsarist, name.  This was done 
in an attempt to remove the institution further from its Soviet past.  Among the reforms 
was an anti-corruption programme, measures aimed at improving personnel selection (one 
of them was the requirement of recertification), raising the level of professionalism, 
stripping the militsiya of unnecessary functions, cutting the number of officers by 20 per 
cent
13
, centralisation of financing, pay rise for militsiya officers by 30 per cent and 
organizational restructuring. 
Medvedev’s reforms attracted many criticisms which ranged from arguments that the 
reforms were purely cosmetic and essentially retained the same system to accusations that 
the innovations would further widen powers of the militsiya’s successor, the politsiya, 
strengthen the grip of the central executive at the local level, do nothing to make the 
institution more accountable and help Russia slide further towards authoritarianism
14
.  In 
one opinion poll only 19 per cent of respondents believed that a radical reform of the 
militsiya would be implemented
15
,  and data from surveys measuring public trust in the 
institution before and after the reforms do not indicate significant improvements (Levada 
Centre 2012a, 2012b)
 16
.   The main achievements of the reforms appear to be limited to 
changing the name of the force, dressing its officers in new uniforms
17
, increasing their 
salaries on average 1,5 times and cutting the personnel by 22 per cent.  Importantly, most 
of the personnel cuts were made in the ranks of politsiya on the ground, while the 
administrative personnel were practically untouched.  The consequence is a heavier 
workload for the remaining officers patrolling streets and the increase in street crime
18
 
(Guzheeva 2012, Khinstein 2012b,  Milyukova 2012, RBC 2012).  With regard to the 
process of recertification to which politsiya personnel was subjected with the aim of 
improving the quality of personnel, anecdotal evidence suggests that senior officers got rid 
of the undesirable subordinates and retained mosty the ones displaying subservient 
attitudes (Fomenko 2012), and in the process demanded payments from their subordinates 
to clear them for reappointments and then passed a share of the bribes up to their own 
                                                             
13   While most countries employ on average 3 police officers per 1000 inhabitants, by some estimates 
Russia employed 6 militsiya per 1000 inhabitants (Taylor 2011: 48) and by other estimates - 10 
(Alexandrov 2012).  
14  See, for example, Galeotti 2010b, Kosals 2012, de Vogel 2012, Mishina 2012. 
15  In the same poll when asked why they did not believe in success of the reforms, 53% thought that the 
reforms were merely measures designed to let off steam and reduce the dissatisfaction of the population 
with the present militsiya, 29% thought that an agency that was not under public control could not be 
trusted to reform itself, and 11% believed that actually the government wanted to have the militisya just 
the way it was at present (Levada Centre  2010).  
16
  So, in November 2009 in a sample of 1516, 19 per cent trusted the militsiya, 39 per cent expressed 
partial trust and 32 – complete distrust.  The respective figures in October 2012 were 20 per cent, 44 per 
cent and 29 per cent (Levada Centre 2012a).   
17  Incidentally, a corruption scandal was uncovered in the process of replacing the uniform (Khinstein 
2012a). 
18  It needs to be noted that available crime data is conflicting: while the official statistics provided by the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs indicate steady reduction in crime, scholars challenge the official statistics 
and claim that crime rate has been growing at 2.4 per cent a year (Odynova 2011, Galeotti 2012).  
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superiors to purchase their own protection (Galeotti 2011).   In the post-reform period 
there have been numerous media reports of corruption, torture, killings and other 
wrongdoings by the politsiya
19
, prompting conclusions that the reforms have failed to 
improve the situation (Alexandrov 2012, Carbonnel 2012, Fomenko 2012)
 20
.  In May 
2012 the new Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokol’tsev came to power and expressed 
dissatisfaction with the substance and the succees of the reforms implemented over the 
three preceeding years.  At the time of writing, a working party under his direction is 
developing a plan of the new reforms
21
, the focus of which will be on boosing the 
competence of politsiya and improving public trust towards them.   
To sum up, in the post-Soviet period the militsiya has found itself in the state of crisis. A 
number of factors (such as underfunding, lack of accountability, high staff turnover, poor 
training) have combined to produce conditions that facilitated systemic abuse of power by 
its officers.  Attempts to reform the institution have been patchy and limited and failed to 
create a democratic police force.  Many Soviet trends were retained, and the role of the 
militisya to prop up the political regime has been preserved.  Historically the militsiya has 
had very little popular legitimacy, and in the last twenty years public trust in the institution 
has hit rock bottom.   Narratives derived from my empirical study, which will be outlined 
below, will prove these conclusions. 
 ‘Violent entrepreneurship’ 
The post-Soviet crisis in the militsiya occurred against the background of weakening of 
other governmental institutions.  The society accustomed to the state acting in a 
paternalistic fashion during the Soviet era was confronted by a major failure by the state to 
secure basic needs of its citizens.  They were left exposed to widespread unemployment, 
mass impoverishment, sharp social inequalities, escalating crime rates, flourishing 
organised crime, pervasive corruption and lawlessness (Gilinskiy 1998,  Rose 1999, 2001, 
Mendras 2012).  Post-soviet citizens had to develop ways of neutralising the failures of 
state institutions (Shevchenko 2009). So, in response to the inability by the state to provide 
order and security, a new industry has emerged and expanded rapidly to make up for the 
failures of the state law enforcement.  That industry has formed an integral part of the post-
socialist society.  Vadim Volkov (2002a) has labeled it ‘violent entrepreneurship’.  
‘Violent entrepreneurs’ included organized criminal groups, private security companies 
and law enforcement officers.  They managed the same resource – organized violence – 
and converted it into money.   
The early ‘violent entrepreneurs’ were criminal gangs.  From the late 1980s they rushed in 
to serve as a substitute for the declining state-provided protection and enforcement 
(Rawlinson 1998, Varese 2001, Shvartz 2003).  At that time Russian economy was 
undergoing rapid privatization, and physical and economic risks of conducting business 
were very high.  This created a high demand for protection and enforcement services, 
                                                             
19  For example, Alexandrov 2012, auto.mail.ru 2012, Brailovskaya 2012, Corrupcia.net 2012, newsru.com 
2012, Poterya 2012. 
20  For a slightly more optimistic assessment of the reforms see Galeotti 2012. 
21  Some of the new measures which Kolokol’tsev has already announced would signify the reversal of 
Medvedev’s reforms, such as the increase in the number of politsiya officers on the ground (Petrov 2012, 
Rodin 2012, Samokhina 2012).   
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which criminal groups readily provided. Some of them offered protection against genuine 
threats of other criminals or business competitors.  Others were parasitic in nature and 
offered ‘protection’ against the treats they presented themselves (Volkov 2002:42-3, 
Taylor 2011:168-9).   
In 1992 the law on private security was adopted, which legalized non-state provision of 
security and rule enforcement.  Private security firms emerged, proliferated at fast speed 
and assumed major responsibilities for providing protection
22
 (Volkov 2000, 2002a).  
Many private security agencies were set up by – and absorbed a large number of – former 
militsiya officers and other former employees of the law enforcement bodies, who had left 
their pervious employment.  Militsiya became one of the official providers in the emerging 
complex security market.  Since 1992 units within militsiya are allowed to offer 
‘extradepartmental protection’ to businesses if the businesses enter into contracts for the 
provision of security services with Extra-Departmental Protection Directorate of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs.  Such provision of protection is legal, carried out by the 
commercial police in state uniforms.    
It is also not uncommon for militsiya to provide protection to businesses unofficially, 
illegally, acting on their own time.  Militsiya may offer a ‘roof’, which involves providing 
protection to clients to minimise their business risks on a for-hire basis.  This may include 
such activities as acquisition of information about potential business partners, supervision 
of business transactions, engaging in informal negotiations with businesses in cases of 
commercial disputes or failures to repay debts.  In such situations militsiya act as private 
entrepreneurs, receiving pay-offs from their clients.  In addition to offering protection in 
pursuit of supplements to their salaries militsiya became engaged actively in various other 
illegal commercial activities
23
, effectively turning themselves into a business entity which 
is concerned primarily with making money (Wilson, et al 2008, Kosals 2010, Favarel-
Garrigues 2011:255-6).  Commercial activities of militsiya range from a beat officer 
making extra cash from people who do not have a residence permit or small street traders, 
to shakedown practices
24
, to militisya opening or closing of criminal cases and releasing 
criminals in exchange for payments, to selling valuable resources controlled by militsiya
25
, 
to collaborating with organised criminal groups (Taylor 2011:chapter 5).  It is estimated 
that militsiya receive more economic gain from supplemental economic activities than they 
do from the state budget, generating income totalling approximately US $ 1-3 billion 
annually (Wilson, et al 2008:74).  
As have been already mentioned, criminal gangs were first ‘violent entrepreneurs’ at the 
time of the collapse of the Soviet Union.  However, by the late 1990s their dominance was 
weakened.  To a large degree criminal gangs were pushed aside by private security 
                                                             
22  The official registration of private security firms started in early 1993, and by the end of that year there 
were over 4,000 private security agencies in the country.  In 1996 the growth rate levelled.  By that time 
the number of such agencies was nearly 8,000, and by the end of 1999 it reached 11,652  (Volkov 
2002a:137).  By 2004 Russian private security became a $2 billion industry (Galeotti 2007:274).  
23
  Gudkov and Dubin (2006) found that over 80% of militsiya in a sample of 634 have some additional 
income. 
24  Typically a shakedown involves accusing a citizen or a business of some real or alleged violation and 
extracting ‘fines’ from them.   In such cases usually people pay militsiya to get themselves out of 
situation. 
25  Such as information, documents, positions and ranks within militsiya.  
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companies
26
 and state law enforcement officers, including militsiya, offering protection 
and enforcement.  Clients found these latter providers of protection more beneficial 
economically and more reliable than criminal groups.  This development, however, did not 
lead to a desirable situation where state law enforcement bodies protect the society acting 
in a legal capacity.  As has been explained above, many of militsiya’s actions are arbitrary 
and illegal.  Using words of one commentator, ‘first step in reconstructing the state has 
been made: the bandit has gone; the state employee has taken his place.  The second step – 
making him act as a state employee rather than a bandit – is still a problem’ (Volkov 
2002b, 1).  These developments will be revisited later in this paper.  Narratives provided 
by my respondents will be used to illustrate the phenomenon of ‘violent entrepreneurship’ 
and highlight some of its social consequences. 
The empirical study  
My study aimed at investigating public experiences of policing in today’s Russia, public 
attitudes towards the militsiya resulting from those experiences and wider social 
implications of those attitudes.  I carried out the study in three waves.  The first two waves 
took place in the summers of 2007 and 2009 in Moscow and Oryol (a city in central 
Russia), and in 2012 I revisited my respondents.  Unlike most research into public attitudes 
towards the militsiya which uses quantitative methods, designed to produce surveys across 
the population (for example, Gudkov 2000, Gryaznova 2005, Obschestvennyi Verdikt 
2009, Levada Centre 2012a, 2012b), this study adopted a qualitative approach, so as to 
offer rich insights into people’s views and opinions that cannot be discovered through 
quantitative studies.  In-depth qualitative interviews were employed as the primary 
research method.  Fifty-four members of the public who had encounters with militsiya as 
crime suspects, victims or witnesses were interviewed.  Respondents were selected using 
purposive sampling (Burns 2000:465, Davies 2007:57-8, Gray 2009:152-3).  The key 
criterion for selection was the requirement that the respondents had had direct encounters 
with the police in the post-Soviet period as crime suspects, victims or witnesses.  The 
sample consisted of 22 men and 32 women; 39 interviewees were employed (8 out of 
whom self-employed), 9 retired and 6 unemployed.  14 respondents were between ages of 
18 and 30; 20 respondents – between 31 and 50; 20 were above 51.  Additionally, 10 
militsiyamen were interviewed.  Six of them were senior officers and four were from the 
lower ranks.  I experienced serious difficulties getting access to militsiya officers who 
could be interviewed.  After several attempts to get an official permission to interview 
militsiya officers had failed, I had to rely on informal connections at first.  Then the 
snowballing technique (Sturgis 2008:179, Gray 2009:153, David and Sutton 2011:232) 
was employed: the militsiya interviewees introduced me to their militsiya friends and 
colleagues either in casual settings or by arranging more formal meetings.     
All respondents gave informed consent.  Questions for both members of the public and 
militsiya were open-ended, designed to enable respondents to express views in their own 
words.  Interviews with members of the public carried out in 2007 and 2009 were 
organised around three main themes: experiences of policing, attitudes towards militsiya 
and impact of those attitudes on everyday behaviour.  When the respondents were revisited 
in 2012, they were invited to share their post-Medvedev’s reforms experiences of policing 
and discuss the changes – if any – in the public image of politsiya that had been produced 
                                                             
26  Many of them had criminal origins.  After the law on private security had come into force, many 
criminal groups refashioned themselves as private security firms and legalised their protection services. 
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by the recent police reforms.  Militsiyamen were asked to comment in interviews on the 
state of the contemporary militsiya and the relationship between militsiya and members of 
the public which has emerged in the post-Soviet era.    All interviews were modelled after 
a conversation between two trusting people, rather than as formal question-and-answer 
session between a researcher and a subject.  Discussions were flexible and it was not 
uncommon for respondents to choose the direction of interviews.  Quite frequently it 
resulted in interviewees beginning their stories with descriptions of their experiences of 
policing and then proceeding to make broader observations on political, economic and 
social events in contemporary Russia.  Often Russian history and working of a Russian 
psyche were discussed at length to illustrate some of the points interviewees were making.  
While narratives of this type did not strictly relate to the topic of policing, they were rather 
informative and provided a wider context for the issues studied.  Some of that data has 
been included in the analysis of findings.  
An approach similar to grounded theory was used (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and 
Corbin 1990; 1998a, 1998b).  Instead of beginning the research with the aim of testing a 
set of preconceived theories, the aspiration was to generate theory from data.  The data 
collected in this study were analysed for patterns in the way the respondents interpreted 
their experiences.  So, when analysing the data, I marked the key points with codes on the 
margins of interview transcripts or field notes (for example, ‘bribe-taking by militsiya’, 
‘militsiya brutality’, ‘thefts by militsiya’).  Then the  codes which related to common 
themes were grouped into similar concepts (for example, ‘abuse of power by militsiya’, 
‘distrust of militsiya’).  Common concepts were then grouped into categories that served as 
the basis for the creation of a theory (for example, ‘predatory policing’, ‘obstacles to 
transition to democracy’).   
This study was small and limited geographically, therefore it makes no statistically 
significant claims.  Nevertheless, it may help to understand some of the general trends in 
attitudes of Russian citizens towards the militsiya (and possibly some other state 
institutions) and their behavioural orientations resulting from such attitudes.  
Findings 
Stories of victimisation and distrust 
When members of the public were asked about their encounters with militsiya, they shared  
essentially the same story – the story of victimisation.  Victimisation experienced by 
people was partly related to militsiya’s inability and unwillingness to help them.  
Numerous examples were provided of militsiya refusing to intervene at the request of 
citizens and defend them when they were harassed, attacked, or robbed.  Also, examples 
demonstrating incompetence of militsiya investigating crimes were offered – an 
incompetence resulting in unsolved crimes or false convictions.  Typically interviewees 
concluded that the militsiya cannot be relied upon to fulfil its functions and offers no 
protection to people. 
While militsiya’s ineptitude and unwillingness to protect citizens was presented as one 
source of victimisation, another most frequently mentioned source was militisya’s 
  Internet Journal of Criminology 
©
 2013 
  ISSN 2045-6743 (Online) 
 
www.internetjournalofcriminology.com  15 
 
 
venality
27
.  Forty-four out of fifty-four respondents admitted that they or their family 
members gave bribes to militsiya, and every respondent in the sample knew somebody 
who had bribed a militsiya officer.  Most examples concerned traffic militsiya who have 
the reputation of being most corrupt
28
.  Other frequent examples involved bribing militsiya 
to escape arrests and detentions, secure a release from militsiya custody, avoid an offence 
being registered and obtain various documents which militsiya issues. 
Interviewees offered multiple stories of militsiya subjecting citizens to extortions.  
Extortion situations differed from those involving bribes: citizens had committed no 
violations of law, nor did they get any benefits in exchange for the payments (other than 
avoiding harassment by militsiya).  Sometimes this practice is called dan’.  It serves as a 
‘tribute’ or an acknowledgement of who rules the street (Humphrey 2002:143-4).  The 
most common victims of extortions listed by respondents were car drivers
29
, migrant 
workers from former Soviet republics
30
 and market traders
31
, although anybody may 
become a victim.  So, many examples were given when people were stopped by militsiya 
in the street without a clear explanation, taken into a police station and released only 
following the extortion of a payment.  In extortion situations payments did not have to be 
monetary and could take form of anything that had value in the eyes of militsiya, for 
example, petrol, or in one case even a sack of apples.  Sometimes demands for provision of 
services were made.  So, an owner of a limousine company complained in the interview 
that local militsiya wanted to be driven around the town in limousines for free.  Several 
other interviewees provided stories of the militsiya demanding free services of prostitutes.   
The next cause of victimisation by militsiya resided in its disrespect towards rights of 
citizens.  Many examples of unlawful stops, searches, arrests and detentions were reported 
by respondents.  Thirty-four interviewees provided examples of militsiya brutality against 
themselves, or their relatives, or people they knew.  Militsiya brutality was perceived as 
widespread and systemic
32
.  To quote a respondent: ‘the militsiya beat people up badly, 
they beat up everybody, almost everybody’.   There was also a common perception that the 
injuries inflicted through militsiya beatings can be very serious. In interviewees’ words, 
‘people are dragged out of militsiya stations half-dead’; ‘militsiya beat people up 
senseless, they trample people down, almost making them invalids.’    In three cases 
acquaintances of interviewees died after militsiya beatings.   
                                                             
27  The perception of respondents in this study that militsiya corruption is very high is consistent with 
findings of numerous other studies, for example, Mazaev (1997), Varygin (2002), Gryaznova (2005), 
Levada (2005).  
28  Some evidence suggests that 98% of Russian car drivers have bribed traffic militsiya at least once 
(Varygin 2002:125).   
29  Interviewed drivers confided colourful stories of being stopped and demanded payments by militsiya.  
Typically, militsiya did not accuse them of any violations and simply asked for money, telling the 
drivers that they needed  money  to buy food for their children, or a dinner and vodka for themselves. 
30  See Human Rights Watch report (2009) for details of abuses of migrant workers in Russia. 
31
  Several interviewees claimed that collecting dan’ from market-traders was a practice very common  in 
the 1990s, but now declining.   
32
   In a survey of 11,202 respondents half of them answered that they fear being physically abused by 
militsiya ‘at least somewhat’ (Gerber and Mendelson 2008).  Another study found that while in the 
overall population 32% are afraid of physical violence and torture by the militsiya, among young people 
35% expressed that fear in a sample of 1600 (Gryaznova 2005:51).    
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It emerges from interviews that citizens frequently become victims of property-related 
crime carried out by militsiya.  Examples were encountered where militsiya were charged 
with guarding factories and used their position to steal from them.  Numerous instances of 
petty thefts by militsiya were also reported, where militsiya stopped people and stole their 
money while searching them or checking their documents.  Additionally, fourteen 
interviewees described situations where militsiya found stolen property, but never returned 
it to its owners.  Time and again interviewees concluded their stories of property-related 
crime by militsiya, equating behaviour of militsiya to that of thieves, robbers and burglars.   
When I informed respondents about the topic of my research, a number of them advised 
against carrying out the study: in their view research into the militsiya was ‘dangerous’.  
When asked to explain why they thought such research could be unsafe, findings emerged 
pointing to a general fear of militsiya on the part of citizens
33
.  To substantiate their fears 
interviewees gave examples involving  militsiya planting drugs or weapons to incriminate 
people, stories of unlawful detentions for many months in inhumane conditions, 
descriptions of militsiya brutality, stories of milistiamen carrying out rapes, random 
shootings and collaborating with criminals.  Simply seeing the militsiya patrolling the 
streets appeared to have an intimidating effect on members of the public.  As one 
respondent explained, ‘you see them [the militsiya] walking with their truncheons, and you 
don’t feel yourself, it’s frightening’.  Some interviewees confessed a desire to cross the 
street when they see militsiya walking towards them.  Young women reported incidents of 
sexual harassment by militsiya, following which they felt particularly insecure
34
.  
Interviewees emphasised that coming into any contact with militsiya may lead to negative 
consequences.  One respondent summed up this attitude: ‘it is best not to look for 
adventures and not to have anything to do with the militsiya’.   
Frequently intervewees compared militsiya with bandits.  To use some quotes: ‘Who goes 
to work in the militsiya?  The lowest, downright bandits and hooligans’; ‘During the 
terrible 1990s we have formed a fear of both – the bandits and the militsiya’; ‘Bandits and 
militsiya are related professions.  They engage in robbery’.  Militsiya respondents 
validated the public perception of militsiya as criminals and admitted that such attitudes 
were not unfounded .  To quote one of them: 
Many people view militsiya in the same way they view criminals.  This is because they see a 
militsiyaman in a street who is not performing his duties, but instead stops people to get bribes, 
harasses people.  Old women selling things near underground stations – they bribe the militsiya in 
order to be left alone.  People see such things. They see scoundrels among the militsiya, and, 
unfortunately, there are many scoundrels. 
Having began with a story about personal victimisation by – and distrust towards and fear 
of – militsiya, respondents often transitioned to decrying victimisation of the powerless by 
powerful people and lamenting broader social conditions in contemporary Russia.  
Detailed narratives of injustices, oppressions, suffering and poverty experienced by 
                                                             
33  In one study the fear of the militsiya was expressed by 26 per cent of respondents (in a sample of 1600) 
and was nearly as high as the fear of criminals (33 per cent) (Gudkov and Dubin 2006).  More recently, 
Levada Centre (2012b) asked 1601 respondents about their feelings towards politsiya.  Fear scored the 
highest number of votes (22 per cent reported it), closely followed by antipathy (19 per cent).     
34  For example, a young woman described in the interview how she and her girlfriends, when they were 13 
or 14, were approached by a militsiya officer, while they were sunbathing on a beach.  The officer 
invited them to go and have sex with him.  She concluded her story: ‘since then I treat militsiya with 
caution’. 
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ordinary people, and greed, selfishness, crimes and impunity of those in power were 
provided.  In the process the speaker frequently switched from the first person singular to 
the first person plural, identifying themselves with a kind of moral community of 
victimised ordinary Russians.  
Sometimes respondents were willing to include militsiya in that moral community.  To 
quote some of them: ‘Militsiya are hungry.  They are paid very little, but have to work a 
lot’; ‘[Militsiya] don’t want to be the way they are, but they are very poor.  If he doesn’t 
take a bribe, he simply won’t survive on his tiny salary...  They are kept in poverty, they 
are victims themselves.’  Militsiya officers in their interviews firmly embraced identities of 
victims.  They repeatedly emphasised how bad their working conditions, how low their 
salaries and how hard their jobs were, how little they were valued and how much they 
were disrespected by members of the public, how the state cheated them.  The state was 
described as an ‘unscrupulous partner’ in the relationship with the militsiya which 
‘abandoned’ its officers and failed to guarantee them a decent existence.   
When my respondents were re-visited in 2012, the situation with respect to the last issue 
has improved: salaries of politisya had been raised as part of Medvedev’s police reforms.  
However, commenting on other achievements of Medvedev’s reforms, the vast majority of 
respondents reported that they did not notice any significant changes and told stories of 
their recent experiences of policing supporting that conclusion.  Only five interviewees felt 
that the situation had improved.  They observed that during their post-reform encounters 
with politsiya, officers seemed more polite, behaved more ‘correctly’, arrived to scenes of 
crime or khuliganstvo
35
 following phone calls by members of public
36
 and recorded 
reported crimes (something, which, according to these respondents, militsiya failed to do 
in the past).  Interstlingly, when these five interviewees provided more detailed accounts of 
their encounters with post-reform politsiya, they were strikingly similar to those preceding 
the reforms.  Once again, evidence of politsiya incompetence, corruption and extortions 
emerged, with some respondents suggesting that post-reform politsiya has become even 
more ingenious in extorting bribes
37
.   Also, suspicions were expressed of collaborations 
between politsiya and criminal groups
38
.    
Stories of degradation and fatalism 
Often in interviews the Soviet past was praised for higher ethical standards in the society 
as a whole, and a common argument was that today’s Russia is characterised by a moral 
and spiritual demise.  People became selfish, disrespectful, indifferent to suffering of 
others and obsessed with money.  Both militsiya and members of the public emphasised in 
                                                             
35
  ‘Khuliganstvo’ is a Russian expression roughly corresponding to what is now called ‘anti-social 
behaviour’ in the UK. 
36  This finding was contested by other respondents who claimed that it took politsiya hours to arrive to a 
scene of crime.  Also, politsiya repondents admitted in interviews that following recent personnel cuts, 
due to insufficient numbers of officers patrolling streets it is often impossible to respond to calls from 
member of the public promptly. 
37  For example, a respondent making such observation described how politsiya made her pay a 1500 ruble 
fine for violation of the traffic code, but the receipt they gave her stated that the amount of the fine was 
100 rubles.  The difference between the actual and the recorded fine was pocketed by them.  
38  So, a respondent informed me that his car had been stolen the previous night.  Since then he received 
two anonymous phone calls, offering the return of the car in exchange for a substantial payment.  The 
respondent concluded that the car thieves had access to the politsiya-held database and obtained his 
phone number with the help of politsiya. 
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interviews that militsiya are a part of the society and thus reflect qualities of the society 
they police, so it was a popular view that the moral erosion of militsiya is part of the 
general moral decline in post-Soviet Russia
39
.   An interesting paradox was observed in the 
stories of degradation.  While the respondents seemed to be convinced that the situation in 
the militsiya deteriorated considerably after the collapse of the communism (militsiya 
became corrupt, disrespectful towards the law, incompetent and unaccountable), their 
stories also provided evidence that incompetence, corruption, extortions, brutality, 
harassment, including sexual harassment, and disrespectful behaviour towards citizens by 
militisya was not uncommon in the socialist past. 
Closely related to both the stories of degradation and victimisation were narratives of 
despair.  When asked what could be done to resolve the crisis in the militsiya and improve 
its public image, respondents typically expressed very pessimistic views and declared the 
situation to be hopeless.  The following quote from an interview with a militsiyaman 
summarises these sentiments: ‘I wish there were prospects of a better future, but so far we 
keep sliding down and down.  The situation is getting worse and worse.  There is no hope’.  
Even when possible solutions were suggested (such as raising salaries or better personnel 
selection), they were quickly dismissed, with interviewees pointing out that resolving the 
crisis in the militsiya would require fundamental changes at various levels of the Russian 
society, and to expect such radical social transformations is unrealistic. 
At this point in interviews respondents typically proceeded to mourn the tragedies of 
Russian existence above and beyond the crisis in the militsiya.  Painful examples from 
Russian history were used to illustrate misfortunes, suffering, abuse and loss experienced 
by Russian people.  The historical examples were mixed with laments of the present 
upheavals and presentations of apocalyptic visions of the future.  The current situation was 
described as a complete degradation and ruin of the society, and, while bemoaning the 
decay of today’s Russian society, interviewees repeatedly emphasised that things would 
get even worse due to materialism, nihilism and lack of morality and spirituality on the 
part of younger generations.  In the process of such laments, Russia was presented as the 
most unlucky and backward nation, and it was often argued that no other civilised nation 
would tolerate the sort of hardships and injustices which Russians put up with.   It was 
claimed that in a Western country the failure of the state to serve the needs of its citizens 
which is observed in Russia today and the resulting suffering by people would have 
resulted in mass protests and even a revolution
40
.  
                                                             
39
  For a similar argument see Korshunov (2002) and Safronov (2003). 
40
  It is remarkable that the dismal conditions in post-Soviet Russia did not produce mass political activism 
on the part of members of the public dissatisfied with the inability by the government to handle the 
crisis.  Instead of civic groups organising around common problems and mobilising to achieve systemic 
change, post-Soviet society adopted a posture of political apathy (Mishler and Rose 1995, Howard 2003, 
McFaul and Treyger 2004).  For most post-socialist citizens dealing with economic hardships became a 
priority: mere survival became a full-time occupation that left little space for political activism (Stenning 
1999; Stenning, et al 2010:235, Shevtsova 2012). In 2011-2012 there have been signs of emerging 
political activism on part of Russian citizens, as illustrated by mass protests against alleged misconduct 
and fraud during parliamentary elections in December 2011.  Although the protests were sparked by the 
election process that was considered to be flawed, they were fuelled by wider public dissatisfaction.  The 
government responded with measures ranging from organising counter-rallies and media campaigns 
aimed to implicate opposition leaders in savoury activities and thus discredit them, to initiating criminal 
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Stories of cynicism 
There was a wide perception on the part of both members of the public and militsiya who 
were interviewed that militsiya are preoccupied not with fighting crime, upholding order 
and bringing the guilty to justice, but with pursuing their private interests.  To quote a 
militsiyaman: 
Most militsiya personnel do not think of fulfilling work-related tasks.  They are concerned mostly 
with resolving personal issues, for example, how to redecorate their flat, or where to get parts for 
their automobile, or where to get food at a reduced price or for free, and they constantly get 
involved in questionable associations for such purposes. 
When describing the style and nature of contemporary Russian policing, interviewees 
frequently compared the conduct of militsiya to that of scavengers and predators.  It was a 
common argument made by both militsiya and ordinary citizens that people joining the 
militsiya do so in order to enrich themselves.  As a militsiya officer explained,  
People typically do not come to work in the militsiya because they want to fight injustice, uphold 
law and help crime victims...  Many join the militsiya because they are attracted by additional 
illegal income.  They earn a little officially, but have a good quality of life because they adapt and 
learn ways how to obtain things for free or cheaply. ... They do not have a high ideology, only 
materialistic calculations. 
While respondents asserted an ability to unmask ulterior motivations of militsiya officers, 
the lack of integrity on the part of  militsiya was frequently blamed on the state which fails 
to reward militsiya for their work, and thus forces them to supplement their income 
through illegal and unethical means.  A militsiya officer, describing the relationship 
between the state and the militsiya, commented that ‘the state pretends that it pays us, and 
we pretend that we work.  Both the state and ourselves imitate conscientious relationships 
which do not exist in reality’.  The loser in this ‘let’s pretend’ game are members of the 
public who get little or no protection from militsiya.   
While respondents viewed militsiya as generally ineffective and unresponsive, they 
pointed out that a bribe may have a positive effect on the ability of militsiya to resolve 
criminal cases.  To quote an interviewee,  
If you don’t have acquaintances among militsiya, and if you don’t pay them, they will never 
investigate your case.  They will shelve it and that’ll be it.  You have to pay them in addition, and 
you have to pay a lot.  Then they may start working on your case. 
Indeed, some stories shared by interviewees illustrate that militsiya can be rather efficient 
if a prospect of a bribe arises.  Interviewees also believed that there was a correlation 
between the economic status of a person and the level of their immunity against abuses by 
militsiya, with the poor being particularly vulnerable.   To use some interview quotes: 
‘Today in Russia only rich people have rights.  If you can’t pay a bribe, it is useless to 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
prosecutions of prominent protest activists, to enacting legislation in June 2012 that imposes heavy 
penalties on protestors engaging in unauthorised demonstrations (Herszebgirb 2012, Pitalev 2012).     
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complain and try to assert your rights’.  Or: ‘In Russia a person is valueless, especially if 
you have no money.  If you have money, you may be able to pay the officials and defend 
yourself.’ 
Other cynical attitudes concerning the inequality of treatment by militsiya involved 
examples of militsiya serving and protecting their powerful patrons and doing nothing to 
help ordinary people.  It was argued that the government regularly uses the militisya to 
weaken its political opponents
41
.  The role of politsiya in suppression of recent anti-
governmental protests has been highlighted, with respondents stressing that serving the 
governmental interests is a high priority of politsiya.  It was also repeatedly emphasised 
that recently the government has rewarded its protectors by raising their salaries as part of 
Medvedev’s police reforms.    
There was a general belief among my respondents that militsiya are free to violate rights of 
ordinary people without any negative repercussions for themselves, with forty-four 
interviewees highlighting their feelings of defencelessness in the face of militsiya abuses
42
.  
The militsiya was typically presented in interviews as a clan institution which protects its 
members, regularly covering up their crimes.  The issue of lack of control over militsiya 
came up spontaneously in almost every interview.  So, an interviewee who had been 
subjected to an unlawful detention argued: ‘A person has absolutely no rights.  That is, 
militsiya may come in and accuse you of anything they like, and you won’t be able to 
prove your innocence’.  Or, as an interviewee whose son had been beaten up by militsiya 
explained: ‘You have no rights when in the hands of militsiya.  You can’t seek justice 
there.  It’s a total lawlessness’.  The trust that Prokuratura or the judiciary will protect 
victims of militsiya abuse of power was also very low
43
.  Examples were provided where 
interviewees felt that Prokuratura and the judiciary sided with militsiya and helped them 
get away with their wrongdoings.  
Stories of self-sufficiency 
As has been pointed out above, there was a wide perception that militsiya were unreliable 
and professionally inept.  It often led interviewees to conclude that reporting crimes is 
useless.  Some felt that reporting crimes may be dangerous because militsiya may accuse 
an innocent person and beat a confession out of him or her.  Others were reluctant to ask 
militsiya for help out of fear that militsiya collaborated with criminals, in which case 
reporting a crime involved the risk of retaliation.  So, in the sample of fifty-four 
                                                             
41  Survey of 1601 respondents carried by by Levada Centre (2012b) found that 33 per cent of Russians 
believe that politsiya primarily serve the interests of the government; 32 believe that they primarily serve 
their own interests, and only 23 per cent believe that politsiya primarily serve to protect the public.  In 
the same survey 34 per cent of respondents believed that the government uses law enforcement 
institutions against its political opponents ‘quite often’ and 14 per cent thought that that it was a regular 
practice.  
42
   Similarly, another study has found that 81% of respondents in a sample of 1600 feel defenceless to 
possible abuse of power by law enforcement officers, and three out of four people see themselves as a 
potential victim of such abuse (Gryaznova 2005).   
43
   Gryaznova (2005) reports that only 30 per cent of Russians think they can get protection from the 
Prokuratura or the judiciary if they become victims of abuse of power by the militsiya.  Levada Centre 
(2012b) found in a survey of 1601 respondents that only 5 per cent believed that they would definitely 
get protection from Prokuratura or the judiciary if they become victims of abuse of power by politsiya, 
24 per cent believed that probably they would get protection, 40 per cent thought that probably they 
would not get protection, while 15 thought they definitely would not get protection.     
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respondents, only fourteen said that they would definitely report crimes.  The majority 
(thirty-four interviewees) argued that contacting militsiya should be avoided if possible, 
and in most cases it is possible.  Six respondents claimed that they would not employ the 
services of militsiya under any circumstances. 
The unwillingness to cooperate with militsiya has created a situation where citizens have 
to be self-reliant in protecting themselves against crime.  Interviewees offered plentiful 
evidence indicating attitudes of independence and self-sufficiency, enabling them to 
survive in circumstances where militsiya cannot be relied upon.  To quote a respondent: 
‘The situation is terrible.  Our militsiya does not protect us at all ... so each person acts in 
his own way.  Each does whatever he can to protect himself.’  Or, to use words of another 
respondent:    
People don’t go to militsiya.  They try to resolve problems themselves.  Everybody finds their own 
solutions, their own ways of defending themselves.  If it’s an ordinary person, he will suffer in 
silence, but won’t go to militsiya – probably 70% won’t do it...  But if it’s a bandit, they will take 
their own measures.  But some look for ways to take revenge.  
Interviewees reported becoming more vigilant in the post-Soviet period and doing the best 
they could to avoid becoming crime victims.  Many people installed better locks, stronger 
doors and bars in the windows to protect their houses.   Those living in blocks of 
apartments put fortified building doors equipped with intercom and sometimes installed a 
concierge.  Various other steps taken by respondents ranged from learning self-defence 
techniques to acquiring guns.   
Three interviewees (all of whom were businessmen) said that they used private security 
firms to guard their persons and property.  One respondent paid militsiya to protect his 
businesses.  The rest of the sample could not afford to purchase protection  from militsiya 
or private security firms, so had to draw on whatever resources they had available.  For 
instance, one respondent described how a group of garage owners who could not afford to 
pay militsiya or private security companies found cheap guards – students.  One of the 
garage owners knew how to train dogs and used his skills to train a pack of fierce homeless 
dogs which assisted the students in guarding the garages.  The task of providing food for 
the dogs was shared among garage owners. 
Some stories told by interviewees demonstrate that sometimes citizens, confronted with 
the failure by militsiya to perform their functions, take law enforcement into their own 
hands.  One way of doing it is to employ services of organised criminal groups.   
Respondents shared examples involving gangsters investigating crimes, settling disputes, 
recovering debts and administering punishments.  It seemed that some interveiwees had 
more confidence in the ability of gangsters than in the potential of the militsiya to resolve 
problems and provide social and moral order.    
Occasionally crime victims or their relatives administer punishments with their own hands.  
So, one interviewee knew of a case that had happened in her town where the father of a 
rape victim did so.  After militsiya had found insufficient evidence to prosecute the rapist 
(it was alleged that a bribe from his family was instrumental in militsiya closing the case), 
the father of the victim shot him.  Another case with somewhat similar facts was described 
by a different respondent: a father planned revenge on a driver who had killed his child 
through negligent driving, but charges against whom were dropped (allegedly with the 
help of a bribe).   
  Internet Journal of Criminology 
©
 2013 
  ISSN 2045-6743 (Online) 
 
www.internetjournalofcriminology.com  22 
 
 
The self-reliant attitudes and behaviours involving informal solutions on the part of 
ordinary citizens (who lost hope that the state would protect them) were paralleled by 
somewhat similar attitudes and behavioural orientations on the part of militsiya (who 
realised that the state would not compensate them properly for their work).  Militsiyamen 
argued in interviews that the low pay makes it impossible to support their families, so they 
have to look for ways to top up their salaries.  These respondents pointed out that many 
militsiya officers had second jobs (for example, working as private security guards or 
transporting valuables), and admitted that there was also a variety of more questionable 
ways to augment income.   Examples provided by militsiyamen in interviews ranged from 
planting incriminating evidence and then extracting bribes from people who have been 
falsely accused, to charging citizens for the very services the militsiya are under a duty to 
perform (such as finding stolen property
44
), to issuing fake documents, selling weapons 
and secret information to criminals, covering up crimes, falsifying evidence and 
fabricating criminal cases or closing them for a payment.  
One twist in the stories of self-sufficiency shared by interviewees related to coping 
techniques aimed at preventing victimisation by militsiya.  When citizens found 
themselves in a situation where abuse of power by militsiya is rampant, yet there are no 
effective formal avenues for complaints, various strategies aimed at self-protection against 
wrongdoings by militsiya were generated.  So, respondents have described numerous 
tactics they have utilised during stops, searches, arrests and detentions which have helped 
them to minimise abuse or avoid extortions by militsiya (such as provoking sympathy in 
militsiya or asserting that one has powerful connections within or outside the militsiya and 
threatening officers with negative repercussions).  An important finding is that when faced 
with wrongdoings by militsiya, typically citizens either pay dan’ or try informal solutions.  
I was unable to find any evidence of people attempting to employ formal complaint 
procedures.  Respondents argued that turning to law is pointless for an ordinary person
45
 
because law in Russia only protects those with money and power.  Using words of an 
interviewee, ‘Ordinary people have no rights.  Rights exist, but they are not for us, they are 
for the rich’.  Or, to quote yet another respondent:   
What is most unfair and the reason why people do not trust the law is this: a man who has stolen a sack 
of potatoes or a chicken goes to prison for 3 years, while a man who has stolen milliards of rubles is 
never punished.  
The lack of faith in the power of the law to protect them resulted in the belief that when 
dealing with militsiya, personal connections, bribes and various other informal methods 
offer more potent forms of defence. 
 
 
 
                                                             
44
  To quote from an interview with a militsiyaman: ‘Say, bandits stole a car.  The militsiya know where the 
car is and tell the car-owner: ‘you pay a certain amount, and tomorrow you will have your car back’ The 
militsiya make money that way’.   
45
  Gudkov (2000) quotes findings of a study which asked citizens to whom they would complain if their 
rights have been violated by a state official.  41% said it is useless to complain, so they will not do 
anything.  14% did not know to whom they could complain or could not answer the question.   
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Discussion 
Predatory policing and Russian transition to democracy 
Findings from this study present a gloomy picture.  They confirm that what Gerber and 
Mendelson (2008) have labelled as predatory policing practices is practically a norm in 
today’s Russia46.  When respondents shared their stories of victimisation (such as those 
involving corruption, extortion and property-related crime committed by militsiya), they 
described behaviour of militsiya as that of ‘scavengers’, ‘predators’, ‘thieves’, ‘robbers’, 
‘burglars’ and ‘bandits’.  The stories of cynicism  demonstrated that behaviour of militiya 
was interpreted as motivated primarily by self-interest and personal enrichment.  Similarly, 
the stories of self-sufficiency shared by militsia officers provided ample evidence of 
militsiya regularly abusing their power for profit.  
It is widely assumed that the creation of democratic government necessitates the creation 
of legitimate, professional and effective police force which respects law, upholds human 
rights, is accountable to external authority and is responsive to needs of ordinary citizens 
(Jones, Newburn and Smith, 1996, Capriani and Marenin 2004, Bayley 2006, Hinton and 
Newburn 2009, Manning 2010).  Of course, police practices cannot by themselves bring 
about democracy, however they contribute to democratic political development  (Bayley 
2001, Stenning 2007).  So, David Bayley (2001:14-15) identifies four norms and argues 
that by following them police can directly contribute to democratic political development.  
First, police must give top operational priority to servicing the needs of individual citizens.  
Second, police must be accountable to the law rather than to the government. Third, police 
must protect human rights, and, fourth, police should be transparent in their activities.  My 
findings suggest that today’s Russian police does not come even close to satisfying 
Bayley’s requirements for bringing about democracy through police practices.  This study 
found that members of the public perceive militsiya officers as above the law and 
disrespectful towards human rights, and view self-enrichment by officers as their ‘top 
operational priority’.   
Another operational priority of officers identified by my respondents related to propping 
up the political regime.  My interviewees complained that while militsiya neglected needs 
of ordinary citizens and were primarily concerned with self-enrichment, they served well 
their powerful patrons (for example, through cracking down on political opponents of the 
ruling elite and suppressing anti-governmental protests).  That is, evidence of the ‘divided 
society’ model of policing (Weitzer 1995:5) emerges from the narratives provided by my 
respondents.  This finding confirms Brian Taylor’s (2011) observation that predation and 
repression functions dominate over protection in Russian law enforcement, and, ‘although 
the performance of the police in fighting violent crime is quite poor, they are fully capable 
                                                             
46  My findings also suggest that the militsiya fits the description of a predatory institution as defined by 
James Burk’s (2001): it has high material presence and low moral integration.  Militsiya (and its 
successor politsiya) has such wide powers that their frequent contact with citizens is likely. So, when the 
sample was re-visited in 2012, all 54 respondents participating in the first two waves of interviews either 
had a direct contact with politsiya themselves or their family member had a policing experience in the 
three-year post-reform period.  With respect to the level of moral integration, this study has found that 
interviewees spoke about moral qualities of militsiya with disdain, describing them as ‘having no 
integrity’, ‘morally impaired’, ‘leeches, parasites on the society’ and claiming that ‘ethics and militisya 
are incompatible concepts’  (see also Zernova 2012a:225). 
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of mobilizing enormous shows of force against opposition protests when required by the 
authorities’ (Taylor 2011:107).  As has been mentioned earlier, Gerber and Mendelson 
(2008) argue that predatory police practices are often intertwined with practices of political 
repression of subordinate groups.  Perceptions of my respondents support this argument: 
predatory and repressive policing practices appear to operate in unison.   
Recent police reforms initiated by President Medvedev are important in this context and 
may be viewed by optimists as laying a foundation for creating a professional and 
democratic police force and improving its public image.  This study uncovered little 
evidence of the reforms bringing about substantial changes.  Perhaps it is too early to 
assess the impact of the reforms three years after their launch, besides this study was too 
small and limited geographically to make definite conclusions.  Yet, signs of a potential 
danger may be detected in some of the findings.  While the general opinion among my 
respondents was that no significant changes in policing practices had taken place, some 
noticed that politsiya appear to behave more ‘correctly’ during encounters with members 
of the public and seem to be more responsive.  However, as pointed out above, when 
detailed description of encounters with post-reform politsiya were provided, there was 
little indication of actual improvement in policing practices and treatment of members of 
the public by politsiya.  Commentators whose ideas have been outlined in the subsection 
‘Russia’s transition to democracy’ at the beginning of this paper believe that today’s 
Russia is an ‘imitation democracy’ with imitation democratic institutions (Wilson 2005, 
Krastev 2006, Furman 2008, Shevtsova 2008).  The recent police reforms may be part of 
that phenomenon.  There is a danger of the emergence of a law enforcement institution that 
may look more professionally and appear to be more responsive, yet appearances may be 
deceptive, and in reality its officers continue to neglect needs of members of the public, to 
be above the law and to perpetuate abuses of power with impunity.  The police force that is 
merely an imitation of its counterparts in democratic societies will fit well within – and 
support – the Russian system of ‘Potemkin democracy’, as an illusion of democratic 
policing may reduce public dissatisfaction and thus help the current regime survive by 
offering it a degree of legitimacy.    
Self-help and anti-legalism 
The narratives of my respondents support Richard Rose’s description of a Russian society 
as an ‘hour-glass’ society where citizens generally do not look to the state for protection, 
try to minimise their contact with it and organise their daily activities so as to insulate 
themselves from the negative effects of the state (Rose 1995).  My findings demonstrate 
that prevailing predatory police practices resulted in a situation where militsiya were 
distrusted and had little legitimacy in the eyes of citizens.  Interviewees felt that the safest 
tactic for dealings with militsiya was to avoid encounters with them whenever possible.  
Far from reaffirming citizens’ belief that they are protected, militsiya seemed to be 
perceived by citizens as presenting a source of danger to their safety.  So, respondents in 
this study expressed a need to practise vigilance in protecting themselves not only from 
ordinary criminals, but also against the very people who are supposed to guard them 
against crime.  Instead of resorting to militsiya for help, citizens often preferred self-help 
methods, some of which have been outline above, to prevent crime and respond to it once 
it occurs.     
It is likely that the lack of legitimacy of the militsiya and public distrust towards its 
officers has historical roots and can be traced back to the Soviet era (Shelley 1996, 1999, 
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Uildriks and Van Reenen 2003), however research evidence suggests that post-Soviet 
experiences of predatory policing have damaging impact on levels of public trust towards 
the militsiya and legal institutions in general (Gerber  and Mendelson 2008, Zernova 
2012a).  A consequence of the loss of legitimacy by the police is that citizens’ everyday 
compliance with the law is endangered (Tyler 2006, Tyler and Fagan 2008, Tyler and Huo 
2002).  So, this study has found examples of citizens taking law enforcement into their 
own hands and resorting to the help of criminal gangs to perform law enforcement 
functions.  Yet, such self-help solutions can often become part of the ‘problem’ rather than 
a ‘solution’ (Goldsmith 2005:450).  Such private methods used by citizens to compensate 
for pathological policing challenge the rule of law and present threats to human rights.  It 
is often said that Russian society is characterised by a culture of anti-legalism, which 
involves a mass scepticism and disregard for the law (Hendley 1999, Kurkchiyan 2003, 
Newcity, 1997).  The loss of legitimacy by militsiya triggers social practices which 
contribute to the already rampant disrespect towards the law, removing Russia even further 
from the possibility of evolving into a society based on the rule of law.   
Some of the practices described by respondents may unintentionally help to reproduce the 
dysfunctional system of policing.    While resenting militsiya venality, a number of 
interviewees provided examples where they used bribery and informal connections within 
militsiya if it appeared to be a useful and effective way of resolving problems.  Some 
bribed militsiya to obtain a release from custody or to have criminal charges dropped, 
others used bribes to obtain fake documents which militsiya issue, such as a driving 
license, a residence permit, or a vehicle registration certificate.  Stories told by respondents 
confirm that such practices have practically acquired the status of a system of relationships 
between militsiya and the public.  By participating in them, citizens help to preserve the 
very system which they resent and reinforce a barrier to creating a transparent and lawful 
system of policing.   
Equally problematic is the finding relating to the unwillingness by citizens to turn to law in 
an attempt to hold militsiya to account for wrongdoings.  As has been pointed out above, 
respondents in this study expressed low trust in the ability of Prokuratura and the judiciary 
to protect them, citing examples of arbitrariness of Prokuratura and unfair judicial 
decisions.  It was clear from interviews that when citizens experience abuse by militsiya, 
normally they do nothing to try and bring wrongdoers to justice.  If people take steps to 
minimise the impact of militsiya abuse (for example, to release a person falsely detained 
by militsiya), typically their recourse is not to courts which they distrust, but to informal 
mechanisms.  With the help of side payments and informal pressures they may resolve 
their predicaments in a case at hand.  Yet in the process they allow toleration of more 
abuse of power by militsiya who go unpunished for their wrongdoings.  The underlying 
power relations that have generated abuse in the first place remain unopposed and allowed 
to perpetuate.  Simultaneouly, the perception of impunity of police provides a pretext for 
further deepening of public antipaty, distrust and cynicism towards the police (Goldsmith 
2005:453).  
An interesting finding is that despite universal expressions of distrust towards militsiya 
and frequent preferences of informal self-help methods uncovered by this study, stories of 
respondents suggested that many of them nevertheless contacted militsiya when becoming 
crime victims.  Only six respondents reported a determination not to cooperate with 
militsiya under any circumstances.  The position of the vast majority was to use in a 
patchwork fashion – often simultaneously – a variety of methods to protect themselves 
  Internet Journal of Criminology 
©
 2013 
  ISSN 2045-6743 (Online) 
 
www.internetjournalofcriminology.com  26 
 
 
against crime and respond to it once it occurs in the hope that at least some of the methods, 
whether formal of informal, may produce positive results.  So, informal self-help 
techniques described by respondents and often perceived by them as more effective did not 
necessarily completely replace a resort to militsiya for help.  Rather, it may be more 
appropriate to view the informal techniques as a moralistic indictment of the militsiya and 
a symbolic expression of distrust  towards its officers
47
.   
Moral critique of the state and the unequal society 
The stories of victimisation and fatalism told by respondents in this study typically 
involved complaints and grievances about the wrongs which they (and other people they 
knew or heard of) have been subjected to by militisya.  These stories detailed abuse and 
pain that were experienced, and expressed powerlessness and despair
48
.  While at the 
beginning of these stories militsiya were presented as the agent of victimisations, as the 
stories evolved, other powerful villains were added and blamed for the suffering of 
ordinary people.  Narratives of individual victimisations caused by militsiya were 
intertwined with narratives of collective victimisations caused to ordinary Russians by 
their rulers.  Respondents frequently linked discussions of predatory practices by militsiya 
to arguments that the Russian government itself is predatory: it shamelessly enriches itself 
at the expense of ordinary people, showing no concern for their poverty, misery and 
suffering.  These narratives supported well Evans’s conceptual model of predatory states 
referred to earlier in this paper – the states that plunder and extract resources from the 
polulation with no more concern for the well-being of the people than a predator for its 
prey (Evans 1989:562).  A number of interviewees mentioned the proverb ‘fish rots 
beginning with its head’ and blamed the decaying militsiya on the ‘rotten’ Russian 
government ‘where there are many unhealthy, dark forces’ and ‘where true criminals sit’ 
(using interviewees’ own words).  Respondents argued that misdeeds by militsiya reflect 
similar processes within the state elite, therefore it is unrealistic to expect militsiya to act 
with integrity when the highest level of the Russian state are completely devoid of 
integrity.  Some interviewees claimed that actually the depraved militsiya suits the 
government and the oligarchs as it makes it easier for them to loot the country.   
Such narratives created a sense of identification and belonging of the speaker to a timeless 
moral community of the long-suffering ordinary Russians, over centuries robbed, cheated 
and abused by their rulers.  As mentioned above, some respondents  even included 
militsiya in that moral community because the state had ‘abandoned’ its employees and 
failed to guarantee them a decent existence, and militsiya themselves repeatedly 
emphasised in their interviews how dishonest the state was in the relationship with them.  
These narratives told by both ordinary citizens and militsiya can be interpreted as 
expressing a moral critique and resentment directed at the state as a whole.  Respondents 
expressed their indignation of abuses of power by state officials and the ruling elite and 
injustices perpetrated by them with impunity on a grandiose scale, and concluded that  the 
Russian state is morally and politically bankrupt.  It cannot be relied upon by citizens to 
protect them, nor is it capable of dealing with the permanent crisis in which the country is 
                                                             
47  Shevchenko (2009) makes a similar observation in the context of using the state medical system by post-
Soviet Russians. 
48  Many passages in these stories were similar to laments observed by Nancy Ries in early perestroika 
years which she calls ‘litanies’ (Ries 1997).  Such laments may be viewed as a Russian cultural mode of 
speaking, or a ritual that involves a particular way of expressing people’s concerns, fears, anxieties and 
frustrations about irresolvable problems and contradictions of Russian social life.   
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trapped.  Thus, the narratives of victimisation and despair emerging from this study 
suggest that the loss of legitimacy by the militsiya in the eyes of citizens may help to 
undermine the legitimacy of the entire state structure in contemporary Russia.   Bayley 
(2001:14) argues that when serving the public is prioritised by the police, the legitimacy of 
the government is increased by demonstrating daily that the authority of the state is used in 
the interests of the people.  My findings suggest that the same is true of the opposite: when 
citizens believe that their safety is no longer guaranteed by the state, indeed, is threatened 
by the very state agency meant to safeguard them, the public support for the government is 
at serious risk.  
Related to the moral critique of the state was the moral critique of persisting and rising 
economic inequalities.  This critique was evident in stories of cynicism, when respondents 
emphasised that, while militsiya are generally inept and unresponsive, they can be rather 
effective when dealing with members of the public who can pay for their services.  Also, 
respondents argued that those who can pay are less likely to be subjected to abuses of 
power by militsiya.  In their stories a firm correlation was established between one’s 
economic status and a level of protection that one can get.  The moral critique of social 
inequality also emerged in the  stories of self-sufficiency shared by respondents.  As 
discussed above, the mistrust towards militisya and unwillingness to cooperate with them 
gave rise to self-sufficient attitudes and behavioural orientations on the part of members of 
the public, which were designed to compensate for the failure by militsiya to perform their 
functions.  The problem with the reliance on self-help is that it results in the inequality of 
protection across various sections of the population (Goldsmith 2003:4), with some being 
unprotected and others being able to hire private security companies or enter into a 
contract for the provision of security services with the commercial police (as explained in 
the ‘Violent Entrepreneurship’ subsection above).  Russian society is sharply divided into 
rich and poor, powerful and powerless, elites and masses, and resources for self-reliance 
are distributed unequally.  Because of different income, status and network connections, 
some people are in a much better position than others to defend themselves against both 
crime committed by ordinary criminals and victimisations carried out by militsiya 
(Zernova 2012b:478). 
As mentioned earlier, in the stories of degradation the Soviet past was praised for higher 
ethical standards in the society as a whole and in the militsiya in particular.  The post-
Soviet moral erosion of militsiya was interpreted as part of the general moral decline in the 
society, when corruption, disrespect towards the law and impunity by state officials 
became the norm.  As has been noted above, a paradox was observed in many narratives of 
respondents who claimed that the degradation of the militisya was typical of the post-
Soviet period, yet then went on to share Soveit-era experiences of militsiya incompetence, 
corruption and harassment.  Somehow those past experiences were not interpreted in the 
same negative light, nor did they attract the same degree of moral indignation as their more 
recent, post-Soviet, counterparts.  Reliable data on the extent of unlawful and unethical 
behaviour by militsiya during and after communism is not available, so the claim that 
militsiya has undergone degradation after the end of communism cannot be verified 
empirically.  There may be good reasons to believe that the frequency and seriousness of 
wrongdoings by militsiya indeed increased after communism (such as weakening of the 
controls over militsiya, deterioration in the quality of personnel, insufficient training, low 
pay).  It is also possible that the move from state-controlled media, with its regular cover-
ups, to market-driven media and the resulting explosion of reports about militsiya 
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wrongdoings has been instrumental in shaping post-communist public opinion that judges 
today’s militsiya’s conduct as more unlawful and unethical than it was ‘yesterday’.   
Yet, there may be another explanation for the public perception of degradation of post-
Soviet militsiya that links the public sentiments to the rise of social inequalities.  That 
explanation may be deducted from Ivan Krastev’s analysis of corruption and anti-
corruption sentiments in post-communist societies (Krastev 2004).  Krastev suggests that 
irrespective of whether it is actually true, the popular claim that post-communism is more 
corrupt than communism is a value statement that includes in itself reflection on the social 
function of corruption.  For Krastev, the key factor explaining the new corruption 
sensitivity in post-communist Eastern Europe is that one specific type of corruption – blat 
– has been replaced by a radically different form of corruption – bribery (Krastev 2004: 
61-67).  Commenting on this transition, Krastev argues that, unlike blat, bribery cannot be 
disguised under the rhetoric of friendship and thus makes people feel morally 
uncomfortable.  Unlike blat which had an equalizing effect, bribe contributes to social 
stratification, making it easier for those who have money to get what they want (Krastev 
2004:66).  If Krastev’s hypothesis is correct, it may help to explain the finding of this 
study that indicates the perception of post-Soviet militsiya’s behaviour as more corrupt and 
predatory, compared to that of its Soviet predecessor, despite the evidence that 
wrongdoings by that predecessor were not uncommon.  There is a moral difference in the 
eyes of citizens between militsiya releasing an accused from custody as a ‘favour’ to a 
friend who is a relative of the accused (a form of blat) and militsiya demaning a bribe in 
exchange for release from custody
49
.  There is also a moral difference between a situation 
where citizens are treated roughly equally when they come into contact with militsiya and 
a situation where one’s economic status and thus the ability to pay determines the level of 
protection that one obtains.  This study has identified a strong public perception that 
militsiya (and law in general) in today’s Russia protects only those with money and power.  
Irrespective of its validity, this perception is significant in itself, as it undermines 
legitimacy of militsiya, contributes to disrespect towards the law and strengthens 
dissatisfaction with the existing order.    
Conclusion 
This study has found abundant evidence of distrust towards – and fear of – militsiya by 
contemporary Russians.  It has been argued that the corrupt, brutal and unaccountable 
police force which lacks legitimacy in the eyes of citizens is one of the multiple obstacles 
to Russia’s transition towards democracy.  Moreover, if citizens view the police as 
illegitimate – indeed, believe that the very state agency designed to protect them actually 
presents threats to their security – the legitimacy of the entire state structure is at risk.   
Twenty-two years after the disintegration of the Soviet empire it is obvious that the 
promised transition to a democratic, pro-Western society is not going to happen in the near 
future, if at all.  Russia remains a society characterized by governmental failure and 
untrustworthy, inefficient and corrupt state institutions, with the militsiya being only one 
                                                             
49  This example is glanced from a story told by an interviewee who had experiences of securing releases 
from militsiya custody for her sons arrested for drunkenness and anti-social behavior both during the 
communist past and the capitalist present.  This interviewee was very critical of the corrupt post-Soviet 
militsiya who extorted payments for the release of her sons.  In contrast, she commented positively on 
the work of Soviet militsiya.  At her story progressed, it emerged that she used to have high-ranking 
friends among them who helped to obtain releases from custody as a token of friendship.  
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example.   Militsiya (and now their successor, politsiya) continue to perform the function 
of propping up the political regime and tend to work for their own interests, instead of 
serving the interests of the population in a manner that promotes the general welfare.  
Russia remains a society where the belief that legal rules can protect an average person 
against abuses of power by state officials seems naive.  Many people search for extra-legal 
ways of shielding themselves from abuses by state officials, as findings of this study 
illustrate.  By doing so they leave authorities to do essentially as they please and hardly 
bring their country closer to the declared aspirations of becoming a state based on the rule 
of law.  The result is clinging to – instead of transforming – the very social conditions that 
generate abuses of power in the first place.   
Meanwhile, members of the public, disenchanted with the state’s ability to protect them 
against crime and bring the guilty to justice, are likely to continue to rely on self-help 
measures that evolved in response to the dysfunctional state of contemporary Russian 
policing, some of which have been described in this paper, in their attempts to compensate 
for the failure of the state to perform its functions.  Such measures enable people to survive 
in an environment characterised by widespread lawlessness, systemic abuse of power by 
militsiya and the inability or unwillingness of the state to protect its citizens.  Having to 
resort to self-help strategies adds to the daily hardships experienced by citizens in the 
country where no public system seems to work the way it is supposed to.  The solutions 
which have been generated by citizens in an ad hoc fashion to remedy institutional failures 
of militsiya heighten the sense of social inequalities, since one’s wealth and social status 
determines the level of one’s security.  This in turn strengthens public resentment directed 
at the state as a whole.  And, as some of these self-help measures involve private 
vengeance and using services of organised criminal groups, they present serious threats to 
the rule of law and human rights and make Russia’s transition to democracy even more 
difficult. 
Recent police reforms initiated by President Medvedev declared aspirations to bring the 
militsiya closer to its Western counterparts.  Further research is needed to assess success of 
the reforms, yet evidence emerging from this study hints that they have hardly altered 
policing practices and the image of militsiya’s successor, the politisiya.  This paper has 
argued that there may be a danger that Medvedev’s reforms result in creating an imitation 
of democratic policing, or, metaphorically speaking, building a new house in the Russian 
‘Potemkin village’ democracy. 
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